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Supervisor:  Thomas M. Hunt 
Fifty years on, we still only have a few of the answers to the many questions surrounding 
the massacre at Tlatelolco. Not yet do we know how many people were really killed, what 
became of their bodies, or where the orders came from. But we have at least confirmed the 
broader strokes of what occurred in Mexico City on the night of 2 October 1968. In this 
paper, I attempt to answer another question: who was responsible? Traditionally, in 
response to this question, historians, activists, and reporters have all pointed their fingers 
toward Mexican President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and his underlings, be they ministers or 
generals. And while blood is most certainly on their hands, I propose we cast a new 
antagonist: the International Olympic Committee and its president, Avery Brundage.  
In most every work on the massacre at Tlatelolco and the surrounding student 
movement, the Olympics appear as nothing more than a footnote, either a point of leverage 
for the students to pressure the government, or more simply the backdrop before which the 
protests occurred. Similarly, sport historians have largely avoided grappling with the 
massacre itself, instead turning their gaze on any number of other controversies that 
occurred at the 1968 Olympic Games. What they missed, and what I will show, is this: 
 vii 
Brundage and the IOC not only had foreknowledge of the impending massacre, but they 
actually pressured the Mexican government into committing it.  
For this paper, I have made use of a wide range of secondary sources, as well as a 
number of newspaper archives, the H.J. Lutcher Stark Center’s 1968 Oral History Project, 
IOC records, the National Security Archive, and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential 
Library’s archive.  
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Chapter 1: Tlatelolco as Proof of Concept 
Everything is possible in peace. 
-Tagline for the 1968 Olympic Games 
On 7 October 1968, the general body of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) met 
in Mexico City for their 67th session. It was the last meeting before the beginning of the 
1968 Olympic Games, and thus there was much to cover—so much so that the meeting 
took four days. There were reports from Munich and Sapporo on their respective 
preparations for the 1972 Games, as well as the election of Lord Killanin to the Vice-
Presidency of the IOC. There was a report from the Finance Commission on the allocation 
of new television revenues to various sporting federations, and a report from the Medical 
Commission on the state of tests for sex and doping. There was even a close vote that 
almost banned all national anthems and flags from the Olympic Games.1  
But what was perhaps most important was what went unsaid. In the pages and pages 
of documents from this meeting, no mention is made of the events that transpired five days 
prior, 2 October 1968. On that day, just nine miles from where the Olympic flame would 
be lit at the top of el Estadio Olímpico Universitario, occurred one of the most important 
events in modern Mexican history, colloquially referred to as the Tlatelolco massacre. This 
event resulted in the death of several hundred student protestors, cut down by their own 
government. 
But for as central a role that the massacre has played in Mexican consciousness and 
identity over the past fifty years, it is not understood in the way that comparable events, 
like the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre or the 9/11 attacks in the United States, are. 
There is plenty of blame to go around for the unanswered questions that remain regarding 
Tlatelolco, from the generations of politicians and bureaucrats who had the power to make 
                                                 
1 Minutes of the 67th session of the International Olympic Committee. Mexico City, 7-11 October 1968.  
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change and didn’t, to the media who were complicit in the state coverup.2 But culpability 
also rests at the feet of the Olympic movement. After all, the coverup itself occurred in 
anticipation of the coming Games, “when the ‘eyes of the world’ would be trained on the 
nation.”3 As Lauren Harper of the National Security Archive wrote, “The 1968 Olympics 
in Mexico City stand out from other tragedies because the ruling Mexican Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) used the international attention of the Olympic games to justify 
intimidating student opposition groups.”4 Though it differs from other tragedies in this 
way, the Tlatelolco massacre is placed firmly within the tradition of governments using 
sporting mega-events to increase militarization or advance neoliberal policy goals—a 
tradition that has only accelerated in the fifty years since.  
Political scientist Jules Boykoff described these mega-events as “upbeat 
shakedowns with high human costs.”5 The most recent, and best documented, of these 
atrocities took place in Brazil, which hosted the World Cup and Summer Olympics back-
to-back.6 Per a report released by a local Brazilian watchdog group, “as many as one 
                                                 
2 The impact of media complicity cannot be overstated. Gonzalez de Bustamante wrote that reporters in the 
1960s would “often sideline journalistic goals of providing accurate and balanced information” in an 
attempt to promote a more positive image of Mexico. All of Mexico’s popular media was in the hands of 
two or three families who, per Paz, “are more interested in earning money by brutalizing the audience than 
in analyzing the countries problems honestly and objectively.” He went on to say that in Mexico, freedom 
of the press was “more a formality than a reality.” Additionally, Gonzalez de Bustamante showed that these 
television executives had strong ties with PRI officials, helping to “create and sustain a system of 
reciprocity that mutually benefited the PRI and media owners.” These two factors combined to create a 
media environment that unfairly portrayed the student protestors while alive, and then worked to erase 
them once dead. Only one of the three newscasts on 2 October 1968 bothered to cover the events in La 
Plaza de las Tres Culturas, and over subsequent days all three networks uncritically accepted the 
government’s version of events. Gonzalez de Bustamante, Celeste. 2010. “1968 Olympic Dreams and 
Tlatelolco Nightmares: Imagining and Modernity on Television.” Mexican Studies. Vol. 26, No. 1.  
3 Noble, Andrea. 2011. “Recognizing Historical Injustice through Photography: Mexico 1968.” Theory, 
Culture & Society. Page 189.  
4 Harper, Lauren. “The Declassified Record on the Tlatelolco Massacre that Preceded the ’68 Olympic 
Games.” National Security Archive. 2014. 
5 Zirin, Dave. Brazil’s Dance with the Devil: The World Cup, the Olympics, and the Fight for Democracy. 
Chicago: IL: Haymarket Books. 2016. Page 189.  
6 Brazil, and Rio specifically, were notorious for the lengths they would go to to hide the country’s poverty 
from international tourists. This practice can actually be traced back to Mexico City as well, where the 
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hundred thousand people were evicted from their homes as a direct result of the World 
Cup,” which excludes entire neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro that were razed to make room 
for Olympic infrastructure over the next year and a half.7 Brazilian laborers were forced to 
work unthinkable hours, leading to an epidemic of avoidable deaths at construction sites 
across the country. One member of the abovementioned watchdog group wrote, in a 
sentence that could easily have come from Mexico City in 1968, “The federal government 
pretends not to see it and the International Olympic Committee hasn’t spoken out about the 
charges of human rights violations caused by the preparations for the Games.”8  
Similarly, regarding the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the China director of the Human 
Rights Watch Sophie Richardson wrote: 
 
The reality is that the Chinese government’s hosting of the Games has been a 
catalyst for abuses, leading to massive forced evictions, a surge in the arrest, 
detention and harassment of critics, repeated violations of media freedom, and 
increased political repression. Not a single world leader who attended the Games 
or members of the IOC seized the opportunity to challenge the Chinese 
government’s behavior in any meaningful way.9  
Evidence of this same pattern can be found in the labor practices in Qatar, the 
austerity in Athens and Vancouver, the political repression in Sochi, and the militarization 
that took place in London and Los Angeles. Before the South Africa World Cup in 2010, 
the African National Congress felt the need to put out a statement saying, “The ANC wants 
to reiterate its condemnation of any murder of any person, no matter what the motive may 
be,” after two whistleblowers were assassinated in the leadup to the event.10 As Dave Zirin, 
                                                 
organizing committee would paint the walls of the slums near where the Games were being held in 
“shocking pink, purple and yellow—temporarily hiding the misery.” 
7 Zirin. Brazil’s Dance with the Devil. Page 31. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Richardson, Sophie. “China: Hosting Olympics a Catalyst for Human Rights Abuses.” Human Rights 
Watch. 22 August 2008.  
10 Zirin. Page 178. 
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sports editor for The Nation, put it, “It’s never a good sign when you have to make clear to 
the public that you are staunchly against murder.”11 But before all of this was the massacre 
at Tlatelolco, which acted as proof of concept for what the world’s sport leaders were 
willing to stomach to have their Games.  
The 1968 Olympics have likely elicited more attention from sport historians than 
any mega-event save the 1936 edition of the Games. Yet most of this attention has been 
focused on the Olympic Project for Human Rights and the protests that grew out of it, 
elevation issues, or matters relating to drug and sex testing. Likewise, the Mexican student 
movement in the summer of 1968 has been written about by numerous scholars. But as 
historian Kevin Witherspoon put it in his monograph on the 1968 Olympic Games, 
“Historians have yet to adequately assess the relationship between the student movement 
and the Olympics.” 12 The intersection between these two defining events of 1968 is mostly 
barren of scholarly work, each having both been reduced to footnotes in the other’s story.  
Other than Witherspoon’s book, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 
Olympic Games, which offers up an entire chapter on the student movement, sport 
historians have neglected the subject of Tlatelolco. In any of the books where it is brought 
up, many of them cited herein, the massacre is often relegated to a passing mention, even 
by more critical historians. And those sportswriters who seem instead to make their living 
cozying up to those in power, as Witherspoon put it, all “seem quite in accord with the 
brutality with which the Mexican student movement was put down.”13 This level of 
attention mirrors most Americans’ level of interest in and knowledge of the topic. As Latin 
                                                 
11 Ibid.  
12 Witherspoon, Kevin. Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games. DeKalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press. 2008. Page 118.  
13 Ibid.  
 5 
American historian Eric Zolov put it, our visions of the 1968 Games “have largely been 
telescoped into a single representation of black-gloved defiance.”14  
An explanation for this phenomenon is offered by historian Ranajit Guha, a titan in 
the field of subaltern studies. In his seminal essay “The Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” 
Guha suggests that historians tend to view popular uprisings as simply natural phenomena, 
a sort of bug in the system common to all modern civilizations. As he wrote, “They break 
out like thunder storms, heave like earthquakes, spread like wildfires, infect like 
epidemics.”15 They are inevitable and unavoidable, and thus it is pointless to address them. 
Boykoff adds another layer to this explanation, suggesting that scholars of social 
movements tend to focus on “the emergence, growth, efficacy, effectiveness, influence, 
and impact of social movements” at the cost of ignoring the movements that are cut down 
before they can gain any influence.16 As he wrote, “students of social movements have not 
yet fully or systematically considered the suppression of dissent or the demobilization of 
social movements.”17 
Studies centered on the student movement or the massacre itself will mention the 
Olympics as a source of anger among many students, who viewed it as a symbol of the 
misplaced priorities of the Díaz Ordaz administration, but rarely will they go further than 
that.18 As Zolov wrote, “With very few exceptions, virtually all of the literature focuses on 
                                                 
14 Zolov, Eric. 2004. “Showcasing the ‘Land of Tomorrow’: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics.” The 
Americas, Vol. 61, No, 2, Page 160. 
15 Guha, Ranajit and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Selected Subaltern Studies. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 1988. Page 46.  
16 Boykoff, Jules. The Suppression of Dissent: How the State and Mass Media Squelch USAmerican Social 
Movements. New York, NY: Routledge. 2006. Page 6.  
17 Ibid. Page 6-7. 
18 The students’ anger was well-founded. In 1970, according to historian Celeste Gonzalez de Bustamante, 
half of Mexico City’s residents lived in squatter settlements. Though Mexico was in the throes of a historic 
economic boom at the time, the new wealth was concentrated in the hands of the few. Per Paz, “In absolute 
numbers there are more rich people today than there were thirty years ago, but also many more poor 
people.” 
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the question of state repression and student protest to the utter exclusion of the broader 
cultural context of this period.”19 He added that the role the Olympics played in the events 
of 1968 “ironically is often overlooked while researchers seek to unravel the politics and 
power plays behind the dynamic of student protest and government response that 
culminated in the massacre.”20 Books on international relations between the US and 
Mexico have treated the event similarly, as worthy of mention but not discussion or 
analysis. Certainly, the fact that the massacre took place in a developing country colors the 
discourse around it, but New York University scholar Kristin Ross suggested that 
Tlatelolco was also overshadowed in our minds by the other great crimes of the 20th 
century, specifically the Second World War: 
 
And yet even to raise the question of memory of the recent past is to confront the 
way in which the whole of our contemporary understanding of processes of social 
memory and forgetting has been derived from analyses related to another mass 
event—World War II. World War II has in fact “produced” the memory industry 
in contemporary scholarship, in France and elsewhere, and the parameters of 
devastation—catastrophe, administrative massacre, atrocity, collaboration, 
genocide—have in turn made it easy for certain pathological psychoanalytic 
categories— “trauma,” for example, or “repression”—to attain legitimacy as ever 
more generalizable ways of understanding the excesses and deficiencies of 
collective memory. And these categories have in turn…defamiliarized us from 
understanding, or even perception, of a “mass event” that does not appear to us in 
the register of “catastrophe” or “mass extermination.” “Masses,” in other words, 
have come to mean masses of dead bodies, not masses of people working together 
to take charge of their collective lives.21   
Most likely none of this negligence is intentional, a sin of omission rather than one 
of commission. But it still creates an urgent problem that needs to be addressed. This study 
will hopefully help with that process. 
                                                 
19 Zolov. “Showcasing the Land of Tomorrow”. Page 160.   
20 Ibid.  
21 Ross, Kristin. May ’68 and its Afterlives. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 2002. Page 1-2.  
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In this study, I will combine secondary source analysis with a review of recently 
declassified documents from the White House, CIA, FBI, Department of State, and 
Department of Defense to show that the United States government was well aware of the 
building tensions and potential for violence in Mexico City in 1968. Then, using historian 
Toby Rider’s model of the state-private network, I will examine the close links between 
the Olympic movement and United States government that formed during the Cold War to 
establish that the Olympic movement would have known about the deteriorating situation 
in Mexico as well. I will make use of a number of interviews with athletes at the 1968 
Games to show the Olympic movement’s purposeful negligence. And then I will discuss 
the impact their inaction has had on the next half-century of Mexican society.  
  
 8 
Chapter 2: Deteriorating Conditions 
In this chapter, I will establish the depth of the United States government’s 
knowledge about the deteriorating conditions in Mexico and growing likelihood of 
violence throughout the spring and summer of 1968, leading up to the massacre on 2 
October. But for the violence to make sense, one must first understand what the Olympic 
Games meant to the Mexican government.  
Because of Mexico’s peculiar origin, growing out of an orgy of violence between 
competing cultures, Mexican identity is complex. As Latin American historian Keith 
Brewster wrote, from  
 
Being dominated by the descendants of European colonisers, Mexicans have found 
it hard to embrace origin narratives that are rooted in pre-Columbian history. 
Simultaneously, the nationalistic political rhetoric of post-revolutionary Mexico 
has made it equally difficult to embrace its Spanish colonial ties. As such, Mexicans 
have engaged in a constant search for a definition of what it means to be Mexican, 
borrowing foreign cultural values and ideas in an attempt to sustain an element of 
civilisation that moves beyond the country’s indigenous roots.22 
This lack of a coherent self-identity has left Mexico insecure in its dealings with 
the rest of the world, according to Mexican essayist Octavio Paz.23 The Olympics were 
seen as a way for the country to solidify a cohesive and coherent national identity, a 
necessary step towards the larger goal of having Mexico take its place among the developed 
countries of the world. The late scholar Andrea Noble described it as “a unique opportunity 
to showcase the economic and social modernity of the ‘Mexican Miracle,’” the country’s 
                                                 
22 Brewster, Keith. 2010. “Teaching Mexicans How to Behave: Public Education on the Eve of the 
Olympics.” Bulletin of Latin American Research. Vol 29. Issue s1. Page 48.  
23 Paz’s essay “The Other Mexico” is one of the more significant writings on Tlatelolco. In it, he made the 
same point as Brewster, though in much prettier prose, writing “As people on the fringes, inhabitants of the 
suburbs of history, we Latin Americans are uninvited guests who have sneaked in through the West’s back 
door, intruders who arrived at the feast of modernity as the lights are about to be put out. We arrive late 
everywhere, we were born when it was already late in history, we have no past or, if we have one, we spit 
on its remains.”  
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period of rapid economic growth that began in the 1940s.24 As the Mexican paper El 
Nacional wrote in 1967:  
 
The Olympiad will confirm to us that we are now young adults; that it is now time 
to abandon our short-trousers mentality. This is not only because the world is not 
as terrible as we thought, but also because we have matured, and that it is good to 
make ourselves aware of this and the responsibilities that it brings.25   
Despite this so-called maturation, the Mexican bourgeoisie was concerned that the 
denizens of Mexico would not live up to their billing as a civilized people on the world 
stage. In other Olympics past and future, most of the stress for organizers comes from 
whether the necessary infrastructure would be completed on time, but this was a problem 
the authoritarian government of Mexico was well-suited to handle. But people cannot 
always be manipulated as easily as resources. The government knew the masses would 
need to be whipped into shape. 
Though this campaign to present a well-behaved people to the world would end 
with hundreds of bullet-ridden bodies, it began much more benignly. In a “top-down 
imposition of values,” the Mexican government spent the years leading up to the 1968 
Games trying to educate its citizenry about how to behave and implementing their vision 
for Mexico City.26 With the willing assistance of the Mexican media, they launched a fully-
fledged campaign to this effect. Street vendors were pushed out of heavily trafficked areas 
as television commercials and newscasts all discouraged Mexicans from engaging in any 
unseemly behavior during the Games. As Brewster reports,  
 
In the final year of preparations alone, the Mexico City authorities spent 24 million 
pesos renovating squares within the city. 200,000 leaflets were distributed offering 
                                                 
24 Noble. “Recognizing Historical Injustice through Photography” Page 189.  
25 Brewster. “Teaching Mexicans How to Behave.” Page 49.  
26 Ibid. Page 51.  
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advice on various aspects of being good hosts, while 700 radio broadcasts and 144 
television broadcasts pushed the message home.27 
This was a widescale operation that the highest levels of government were very 
invested in. Nothing was going to go wrong during Mexico’s coming-out party.  
 
The PRI and the Abandoned Revolution  
The US first started to monitor the situation in Mexico City in March 1968. The 
CIA prepared a memo in advance of Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s April trip to 
Mexico City that read in part: 
 
The political situation in Mexico is stable, and security conditions in Mexico City, 
a metropolis of nearly five million residents, are good. The Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) virtually monopolizes Mexican politics, while Díaz 
Ordaz dominates the party without significant challenge to his authority.28 
The memo also mentions that “The Mexican Government maintains surveillance 
over the activities of most of these [dissident] groups and would probably have advance 
warning if any major disorders were planned.”29  
The next month, the Mexican embassy contacted the US Department of Defense 
“for assistance in obtaining expedited delivery of” military radios.30 As tensions escalated 
throughout the summer, so would their requests, as they would soon be asking the US for 
weapons, ammunition, and riot gear to arm their police and soldiers.31 As historian Erin 
Redihan explained, “Washington complied, as it associated the demonstrations with a 
nascent communist movement in Mexico rather than a rejection of the Olympics.”32 
                                                 
27 Ibid. Page 52.  
28 CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, Security Conditions in Mexico, March 28, 1968, Secret. 
29 Ibid.  
30 DoD letter from State Dept, Mexican Request for Military Radios, May 24, 1968.  
31 DoD letter from State Dept, Out-of-Channels Request from Mexico, July 18, 1968.  
32 Redihan, Erin. The Olympics and the Cold War, 1948-1968: Sport as Battleground in the U.S.-Soviet 
Rivalry. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. Inc. 2007. Page 195. 
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By 1968, the Mexican government had established a record of brutal repression in 
response to any protest against the state. In 1940, the Mexican army shot at laborers 
protesting poor working conditions, killing eleven. Twelve years later during the reign of 
President Ruiz Coretinez, 200 Mexicans were murdered by their army at another protest of 
government policies. In 1959, a protest by the railroad workers union resulted in its leaders 
being arrested and the rest fired. A doctors’ strike in 1964 was similarly crushed. This was 
the political environment in which the students existed.  
One might ask why such movements would be necessary just a few decades after 
the populist Mexican Revolution overthrew the authoritarian regime of Porfirio Díaz. 
Unfortunately, despite the progressive politics of revolutionary leaders like Emiliano 
Zapata and Pancho Villa, the Revolution itself birthed a single-party political system. The 
Revolution was coopted by the ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as 
a symbol used to legitimize their undemocratic stranglehold on the Mexican state. As the 
PRI gained both power and wealth, they quickly abandoned any trace of revolutionary 
politics. As prominent Mexican historian Josefina Zroaida Vazquez wrote, “The 
construction of the modern capitalist economy in Mexico required that some of the central 
elements of the regime’s ideology—such as democracy or social justice—lose much of 
their content.”33 Thus instead of this revolutionary lineage, Mexican identity was 
intentionally constructed around ideas of nationalism, as the PRI preyed on the citizenry’s 
insecurities about their own country being overshadowed by the United States. As Vazquez 
wrote, the appeal to “postpone struggles based on class interests for the sake of the national 
                                                 
33 Zoraida Vazquez, Josephina and Lorenzo Meyer. The United States and Mexico. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. 1985. Page 155.  
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interest” became the recurring clarion call of the PRI-controlled Mexican government 
throughout the 20th century.34  
 
Origins of a Movement 
The 1968 student movement came from modest beginnings. It can be traced directly 
back to a chance encounter between two separate student groups marching through the city 
streets celebrating the 10th anniversary of Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba. The two 
groups were from rival schools—Preparatory School Isaac Ochoterena and Vocational 
School Number Two of the National Polytechnical Institute—so inevitably when they ran 
into each other, a fist fight broke out. Mexico’s notorious riot police arrived at the scene 
and fell upon the schoolchildren, injuring many and sending the rest scurrying back 
towards their respective campuses. The police pursued them onto campus, beating not just 
the students but the faculty that tried to protect them. This act violated a hallowed tradition 
in Mexican culture of university autonomy. As Witherspoon wrote, “Discipline of the 
students had always been the sacred preserve of university officials.”35 This was the act 
that catalyzed the movement against police brutality and ignited the protests that would 
take over Mexico City during the summer of 1968.   
The student movement itself was, initially at least, not the radical leftist crusade the 
state made it out to be.36 As Witherspoon wrote, “The rank-and-file of the student 
movement consisted of a diverse group whose motivations ranged from radical political 
beliefs to mild political interest to the thrill of challenging authority and skipping school.”37 
                                                 
34 Ibid.  
35 Witherspoon. Before the Eyes of the World. Page 109.  
36 Brewster described the early movement as “merely the latest symptom of longstanding tension caused by 
a generational challenge to state paternalism” while Noble wrote that the students’ issue was mainly with 
“the arbitrary patriarchal authority of the ruling party.” 
37 Witherspoon. Before the Eyes of the World. Page 110. 
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Paz compared the movement to a plague in its ability to transverse social boundaries, 
writing that it “annulled ideological classification.”38 Unlike the massive student 
movements that formed across the world in 1968, Mexico’s—in its early stages—lacked  
the political drive that others had in places like Paris and Detroit. Per Witherspoon:  
 
While they waved pictures of Che Guevara and Mao Tse Tung, Mexican students 
were not calling for a revolution as some other students around the world were, and 
they did not call for a significant overhaul of the political system. […] At its 
genesis, what the student movement wanted most was an apology and to be left 
alone by the authorities.39  
But in the heat of the summer, the movement’s politics calcified. What began as a 
protest against police brutality and for university autonomy became a movement for 
economic justice and democracy, calling for the end of the one-party rule that had defined 
Mexican politics since the Revolution. Some scholars (as well as at various points both the 
US and Mexican governments) have suggested this radicalization was due to influences 
from either Soviet or Cuban agents that infiltrated the movement. But this view can be 
problematic, as it robs the students of their agency. As Guha wrote, attributing their actions 
and ideas to outside influence means “denying a will to the mass of rebels themselves and 
representing them merely as instruments of some other will.”40 He suggests this is a trend 
among western academics when studying popular movements, going on to say that “In 
                                                 
38 Paz, Octavio. The Labyrinth of Solitude. New York, NY: Grove Press, Inc. 1985. Page 221.  
39 Witherspoon. Before the Eyes of the World. Page 110. Paz expanded on the movement’s politics as well, 
writing, “Unlike the French students in May of the same year, the Mexican students did not propose violent 
and revolutionary social changes, nor was their program as radical as those of many groups of German and 
North American youths. It also lacked the orgiastic and near-religious tone of the “hippies.” The movement 
was democratic and reformist, even though some of its leaders were of the extreme left. Was this a tactical 
maneuver? I think it would be more sensible to attribute that moderation to the circumstances themselves 
and to the weight of objective reality: the temper of the Mexican people is not revolutionary and neither are 
the historical conditions of the country. Nobody wants a revolution. What the people do want is reform: an 
end to the rule of privilege initiated by the National Revolutionary Party forty years ago.” 
40 Guha. Selected Subaltern Studies. Page 82.  
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bourgeois-nationalist historiography it is an elite consciousness which is read into all 
peasant movements as their motivating force,” and thus something to be guarded against.41  
Despite the popular goals of the student movement, it never got much support from 
other demographics. This can partly be blamed on the class differences between students 
and workers. Many viewed the protesters as “spoiled kids marching in the streets when 
they should have been in class.”42 Yet it is critical to note that this lack of support also 
speaks to the level of control that the PRI had over Mexico in the 1960s. Witherspoon notes 
that “the most important labor unions and organizing bodies among the workers had been 
incorporated into the PRI.”43 No serious opposition to the PRI had formed over the past 
half century, because the PRI never allowed it to.  
 
Since the beginnings of the Mexican Revolution, opposition groups operated only 
so far as the government allowed, never seriously challenging the established 
system and yet never entirely snuffed out. Leaders of groups that started to speak 
too loudly were usually co-opted into the PRI and thus silenced. Often such groups 
found their voices squelched by a publicity infrastructure that was entirely 
controlled by the government; paper and ink for printing pamphlets or newspapers, 
space on billboards, airtime on radio or television, and virtually any other means of 
reaching a wide audience were either government owned or sympathetic to the 
PRI.44  
 
Rising Temperatures in Mexico City 
The first connection on paper between the protest movement and the Olympic 
Games is found in a 19 July 1968 report on student unrest throughout the country. Detailing 
the initial protests spreading from university to university, the report read:  
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[REDACTED] have suggested the possibility of disorder at the 90,000-student 
National University in Mexico City. Chronic unrest there and indications that 
agitators are planning disturbances during the Olympics have already led the 
government to tighten its control on the students.45 
The first records of violence between the students and government can be found 
less than two weeks later. Executive liaison officer for Latin American affairs William 
Bowdler sent a memo to the White House, eventually read by the President, which 
explained:  
 
Since last Friday Mexico City has been the scene of almost constant student 
turmoil. The difficulty started when an authorized rally to celebrate the Cuban 26 
anniversary degenerated into vandalism and arson. The police intervened and had 
to use tough tactics against student participants to bring the situation under 
control.46  
The memo goes on to say that the situation did not stay under control for long. 
Instead, it escalated into “increasingly violent confrontations between students and security 
forces in successive days.”47 A CIA report on the escalating violence details that “federal 
paratroopers who were called in to restore order roughed up several hundred youths and 
broke into university-connected schools, thereby violating university autonomy.”48 The 
Department of Defense was also was also monitoring the violence, as they created a report 
describing how the Mexican government met the students’ stone throwing with batons, tear 
gas, fixed bayonets, and a bazooka. US embassy officials bought the official line of the 
Mexican government that the unrest was caused by communist agitators with support from 
the Soviets and Cubans. But as Kate Doyle, director of the National Security Archive’s 
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Mexico Project, wrote, “Embassy officials were closer than those of other US agencies to 
the Mexican political class and tended to believe its propaganda.”49 That position would 
quickly be discarded by the US government “as a more realistic analysis replaced the 
fictions spun for public consumption” by the Díaz Ordaz administration.50  
On 30 July, student leaders met with Mexico City Mayor Alfonso Corona del Rosal, 
and presented him with a list of seven demands: 
 
a) Removal from jobs of Federal District Police chief (army Lt gen Luis Cueto 
Ramirez) and his assistant. 
b) Firing of those responsible for injuries to students and damage to facilities at 
Vocational School #5.  
c) Payment of indemnity to students injured.  
d) Changes in law pertaining to intervention of authorities during disorder.  
e) Destruction of police dossiers opened on students arrested.  
f) Release of detained students.   
g) Immediate withdrawal of police and federal troops from all school properties.51  
These demands show how the size of the movement as well as the youth of its 
participants belied its organization. The mayor agreed to five of the seven demands, and 
promised to continue to review the other two. The detained students would be released; 
police and military were to be removed from all schools; no dossiers on students arrested 
would be opened; and injured students would receive payments from the state for their 
injuries.52 The mayor proposed a “joint commission, composed of governmental, student 
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and faculty representatives” to “investigate the various charges and versions of what had 
happened, and who was to blame.”53 
However, this would not be the unifying and healing experience the mayor wished 
it to be. Some factions within the student movement called for a strike, and university 
classes were suspended. Relationships between the students and their government 
continued to erode, as the first student fatalities occurred during these late July skirmishes. 
Student organizers claimed those fatalities numbered 48, yet the government refuses to 
acknowledge any of them. The students continued to march in protest regularly, sometimes 
numbering close to 100,000 strong. Mexican officials, though, were not concerned with 
the students or their demands. Rather, according to a White House memo, their concerns 
were with the optics of the situation, the “image projected by the disturbances and the 
impact on the Olympics in which they have so heavily invested.”54 The Department of 
Defense believed said impact could be significant, writing in a report that “It is believed 
that continued demonstrations, and particularly any further violence, will endanger the 
success of the Olympics.”55 
In the immediate aftermath of the late July violence, the Mexican government 
changed tactics. As another White House memo reported, the Mexican regime was now 
“allowing the students pretty much a free rein of demonstrations and indicating a 
willingness to negotiate grievances.”56 They believed this would be the quickest way to 
end student demonstrations before the Games began, but the students’ commitment to 
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demonstrating was not dulled. By the end of August, Díaz Ordaz was already pivoting back 
to “a get-tough, no-nonsense posture with the students,” because that had clearly worked 
so well the first time.57 A US government report stated this would likely result in an 
increase in violence in the coming days and weeks, which could “seriously affect the pre-
Olympic atmosphere.”58  
In his 1 September state of the union address, Díaz Ordaz angered many of the 
students, emphasizing “the need to keep dissidence within legal bounds” and stating that 
in this matter “excess would not be tolerated.”59 He ignored many of the students demands, 
and gave only minor concessions to the others. By the next week, reports suggested 
violence had decreased sharply in Mexico City once the government moved forcefully 
against the striking students. The atmosphere was described as uneasy, with widespread 
“public confusion and panic” as tensions seemed to be mounting.60 And with the Olympics 
only weeks away now, it was certain the Mexican government “will probably meet any 
attempt to resume demonstrations with very tough measures.”61 Documents show the US 
had little faith in Díaz Ordaz’s ability to handle the situation. One CIA report criticized the 
Mexican government: 
 
At times, since the beginning of the disturbances, the government has not seemed 
unified or certain as to what action should be take. Aside from forceful repression 
of violence initiated by students, there was a period when the government took no 
positive steps. […] The government seemed unable to mobilize itself to deal with 
the mounting problem. This experience has shown that the government and the 
National Revolutionary Party do not possess the power and near total control over 
public behavior which existed previously.62 
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While believing the Mexican government continued to underestimate the student 
movement, US officials also believed the students would have “only a limited ability to 
cause serious disruption at the Olympics.”63 Though their marches sometimes featured 
signs critical of the city hosting the Olympics when there were more pressing needs, 
stopping the Games was never a goal of the movement.64 At most, they saw it as a point of 
leverage. As Zolov wrote, “The virulence of protestor’s attacks—largely aimed at President 
Díaz Ordaz—reflected more a critique of the authoritarian nature of Mexican society than 
an attack on the Games per se.”65 The students promised not to disrupt the Games with 
their protests, but Díaz Ordaz administration’s concerns were not assuaged.66  
On 18 September, the stakes were again raised as the Mexican army sent between 
5,000 and 10,000 troops to occupy el Universidad Nacional Autonóma de México 
(UNAM), taking as prisoners 765 students and faculty. The Mexican government brought 
in troops stationed outside of Mexico City for the first time, marking an escalation of the 
situation and giving an indication of its growing seriousness. The government released a 
statement saying the university was taken in response to fallacious “student threats to 
sabotage the Olympic Games.”67 Encounters between the police and students again grew 
violent over the next few days, and US sources claimed that “the number of injured went 
into the hundreds” as the groups began to more frequently exchange gunfire.68 A top secret 
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CIA report stated that with the Olympics growing ever closer, the Mexican government 
was “fully determined to use as many troops and as much force as needed to ensure peace 
during the Games.”69 By 27 September, “at least 15 are reported dead, large numbers are 
wounded, and about 2,000 persons have been arrested.”70  
But on 28 September, it seemed the possibility of compromise found new life. As 
Witherspoon wrote, “Students and the government alike began speaking of a 
rapprochement and making concessions, however mild.”71 The army began to withdraw 
from the university and President Díaz Ordaz replaced a member of the Congressional 
Committee on Student Affairs that the students had identified as an enemy of the 
movement. Students returned to campus, and on 1 October, the US ambassador to Mexico 
sent the message, “Tensions seem to be easing in Mexico City.”72 
 
The Massacre at Tlatelolco  
On 2 October, students again gathered to demonstrate at la Plaza de las Tres 
Culturas (Plaza of the Three Cultures). The Plaza was and is a “site of singular importance” 
for Mexicans, already seeped in blood and history even before 2 October 1968.73 The 
protest that would end in tragedy that day was not marked by the anger that had defined 
the previous months. The mood was described as “entirely peaceful, and over the course 
of the evening enthusiastic cheers interrupted a pleasant, picniclike atmosphere.”74 
Celebration was called for, as the movement was finally showing signs of spreading to 
other demographics. Per John Rodda’s reporting from Mexico City, representatives from 
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the railway workers union were in attendance, while “the petrol workers, the telephonists, 
and the electricity workers’ union” also signaled their support.75 Many students were also 
accompanied by their families. For what happened next, I borrow from Witherspoon,  
 
Suddenly, at about 6:20 p.m., two helicopters swooped low over the square. A few 
moments later, thousands of army troops, who had quietly observed the protest for 
most of the afternoon, moved to seal off all exits from the square. A third military 
group, the Olimpia Battalion, which had been raised and trained as a security force 
for the upcoming Olympics, opened fire on the crowd from a number of balconies 
that lined the square. The crowd was helpless. The unarmed students formed a 
panicked human wave, rushing desperately for some escape. They trampled one 
another, a reckless stampede that left some students crushed in their wake. From 
every side the students met death: from bayonets, from gunfire, from helicopters, 
even from tanks. The killing continued for over an hour, subsided for a few minutes, 
then resumed. Until eleven o’clock the firing was nearly constant, and stray shots 
were heard even into the next day. Students fled into the apartments that ringed the 
square, huddling on the floor with strangers who took them in. Soldiers and tanks 
saturated these buildings with bullets and grenades, blowing out windows and 
wounding many people inside. The barrage burst many of the pipes in the building, 
soaking the terrified residents and contributing to their discomfort and confusion. 
The troops then stormed the apartments, arresting not only anyone who looked like 
a student but many of those who had tried to help them. Those arrests were sent 
through a gauntlet of soldiers and police, beaten and groped as they were pushed 
toward the trucks awaiting them.76  
The US government’s immediate reaction to the massacre was to accept uncritically 
the Mexican government’s version of events, which falsely blamed the shooting on non-
existent armed student snipers.77 Several weeks passed before the US government started 
to more critically view the official telling of the event, thanks to CIA agents on the ground 
in Mexico whose own versions of events contradicted that of the Mexican state.78 Yet even 
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as the truth started to come out, the US government refused to condemn what happened in 
Mexico, and “quietly accepted the use of force by Díaz Ordaz.”79 This early period of 
unknowing was likely critical in governing reactions to the event, as the Olympics were 
half over by the time anyone began to question what had happened. 
Jacobo Zabludovsky, Mexico’s most prominent anchorman in the 1960s, admitted 
decades later that “the government applied pressure to [the Mexican media] immediately 
after the massacre in attempts to limit the amount of information that was broadcast.”80 So 
it seems likely that Díaz Ordaz would reach out to the IOC as well to ensure the fallout was 
mitigated. IOC president Avery Brundage’s main concerns were, as always, centered on 
protecting the image of the Olympic Games and, by association, Mexico. As historian 
Simon Henderson wrote, the IOC “did not want any form of political activism to enter the 
sporting arena and consistently maintained this approach both in the lead-up to and during 
the 1968 Olympics.”81 Brundage had previously emphasized to the Mexicans “the 
necessity of constructive publicity,” saying that “Mexico can lose all the intangible benefits 
which come from staging the Olympic Games if the publicity is not favorable.”82 He 
warned against journalists, who “are always seeking sensation and something to criticize 
adversely.”83 And since the state-sanctioned murder of several hundred of its citizens 
certainly has the potential to foster such adverse criticism, it follows that Brundage would 
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do what he could to make the event go away, the fallout from which will be explored in 
later chapters.84 
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Chapter 3: The State-Private Network 
Having established the degree to which the US government had foreknowledge 
about the massacre at Tlatelolco, in this section I will elucidate the depth of the relationship 
between the Olympic movement and the US government to show that the Olympic 
movement most likely had knowledge of the developing situation in Mexico City as well. 
This relationship is part of what was described by historian Toby Rider as the ‘state-private 
network.’ The roots of this network can be traced back to the early Cold War, when the US 
government began actively forming relationships with private organizations and 
individuals to help further government goals, mostly related to propaganda. As assistant 
secretary for Public Affairs Harold H. Howland rationalized it in 1948, “The brunt of the 
battle may be borne by the government, but like modern war, this is a total effort in which 
we are all equally engaged, whether in a commanding or supporting roll.”85 George 
Kennan, the first director of the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff echoed these 
sentiments. “Throughout our history,” he said, “private American citizens have banded 
together to champion the cause of freedom for people suffering under oppression. Our 
proposal is that this tradition be revived specifically to further American national interests 
in the [Cold War].”86 While the government would create their own ‘private’ front 
organizations where none were found, they preferred to partner with preexisting groups 
whenever possible. And as Rider wrote, “Sports could not be insulated from this total war; 
the Olympics could not be excluded from such a battle.”87 This made the USOC an ideal 
partner for the government.  
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But this partnership was precipitated by a shift in Soviet ideology as it pertained to 
sport. Previously, the Soviets viewed physical activity more as a practical means to create 
a strong and healthy citizenry. Sport as competition, including the Olympics, were 
eschewed as bourgeois Western culture. Yet by the early 1950s, that view had shifted. As 
Rider wrote, “the Kremlin now viewed sports as a significant platform to promote 
communist ideology to a global audience through athletic performance and cultural 
exchanges.”88 This plan was no secret. As the US embassy in Moscow reported, any and 
all Soviet sport participation was meant solely to establish to the world audience the 
“superiority of either socialist man, the Soviet state, or both.”89  
Increased Soviet attention to sport demanded that the US government had to match 
it. Sport became, per historian Thomas Domer, “an arena for ideological conflict” where 
“Soviets and Americans both drew a direct propaganda link between sport triumphs and 
the viability of their ideology.”90 And nowhere provided a more prominent arena from 
which to establish superiority than the Olympic Games. Thus, over time, those sport 
administrators who had previously forsworn any politics corrupting their sports would end 
up forging “extraordinary ties with Washington.”91  
This courtship began in 1950, when the Department of State reached out to then-
USOC President Avery Brundage to discuss approving West Germany’s application to join 
the Olympic Movement. Ties would deepen throughout 1951, culminating in a meeting in 
Vienna between undersecretary of state James Webb and J. Brooks B. Parker, an American 
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member of the IOC. Here, Parker, who had previously worked for both the Treasury and 
State Departments, told Webb that the USOC was willing to “abandon its long standing 
policy of operating without reference to or consultation with” Washington.92 And then in 
1952, the USOC gave the Office of Private Enterprise and Cooperation, the division of the 
Department of State tasked with managing the state-private network, a “pledge of close 
cooperation.”93  
This was a serious inflection point in the relationship, as from here on out the level 
of communication and cooperation between the USOC and government reached 
unprecedented levels. Two government agents were permanently assigned to the USOC to 
act as liaisons and provide policy guidance from the government to the committee. 
Olympic officials like Brundage began to provide both interviews and written articles for 
the US propaganda machine both at home and in Europe, and the USOC even brought two 
“US propaganda experts” along to the 1952 Summer Olympics in Helsinki as part of their 
entourage. Their mission: make the Olympics “serve as a vehicle to define freedom and 
democracy.”94 As one foreign policy expert put it at the time, the Games should work to 
“project a positive and favorable picture of American life, and support US foreign policy 
objectives.”95 The government rewarded the USOC for abandoning their principles with 
additional help fundraising for the Games.  
 
Sportsmen-in-Chief 
This relationship would continue throughout both the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations. As Domer wrote, both administrations took “every opportunity short of 
                                                 
92 Ibid. Page 56.  
93 Ibid. Page 58. 
94 Ibid. Page 60. 
95 Ibid.  
 27 
direct and total subsidy to enhance the sport image of the United States.”96 Hundreds of 
sport teams and coaches were sent abroad as part of myriad goodwill tours or exchange 
programs funded by the Department of State, with the goal of creating “a network of 
positive social interactions” to forestall any future conflict and create new allies.97  
Eisenhower and Kennedy also used sport as a domestic policy tool. As historian 
Thomas Hunt wrote, they “believed in the necessity of a broadly-based national fitness 
campaign to reverse the country’s declining levels of physical fitness,” leading to the 
establishment of government bodies like the President’s Council on Youth Fitness.98 They 
saw improving fitness in the general citizenry as having the trickle-down effect of 
improving the pool of athletes from which to pick for international competition as well. 
Hunt quotes Dr. Shane McCarthy, the executive director of the Council, as saying “If we 
succeed at getting our country off its seat and on its feet, the victories in the field of 
international competition will inevitably follow.”99 
Lyndon Johnson, who occupied the White House in 1968, differed from his 
predecessors Eisenhower and Kennedy in that he had little interest in sport, either as a tool 
of international diplomacy or one of domestic policy. One Washington Post article put it 
politely by saying that sports were “an acquired taste” for Johnson.100 Robert Lipsyte of 
the New York Times was somewhat less charitable, writing that the “current 
Administration’s poor record in sports” was metaphorically “a record of errors in the field, 
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dropped passes, missed third strikes, excessive personal fouls.”101 As historian Erin 
Redihan wrote,  
 
While Eisenhower and Kennedy had both been enthusiastic participants in and 
supporters of American sports, Johnson did not share this affinity. As such he never 
ascribed the same importance to sports, either recreationally or on the elite / 
professional level as his predecessors had. Consequently, he made little impact on 
the Olympic movement during his first year in office, which spanned the Innsbruck 
and Tokyo Games, beyond issuing the standard adulatory message following the 
Games.102   
This is not to say that the Johnson Administration was a firm believer in the 
separation of sport and state. That branch of the state-private network was as healthy as 
ever, as members of the USOC were still meeting regularly with representatives from the 
Departments of State, Justice, and elsewhere. And the White House was by no means afraid 
to use sport to make a political point when the situation arose. One such occurrence 
happened in 1964, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk contacted Avery Brundage, by that 
point President of the IOC, and convinced him to remove part of the delegation from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the Olympic Games in Tokyo.103 Another 
happened two years before the Mexico City Games, when San Juan, Puerto Rico was set 
to host the Caribbean Olympic Games. Despite frayed political relations at the time, the 
United States issued visas to the Cuban contingent to attend the Games in Puerto Rico. 
However, as White House documents show, they had no plans to let this occasion go by 
without scoring some points first. As one internal memo noted, “Normally, we would 
refuse authorization because of our air isolation policy and OAS commitments. The Cubans 
could still go to Puerto Rico by commercial carrier from a third country – Mexico or 
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Jamaica.”104 The Johnson Administration saw the opportunity to use this sporting event as 
a point of leverage to help further their international agenda, as the memo continued,  
 
In this case, we proposed to the Cubans that if they would authorize special flights 
to Cuba to pick up Americans and their families (about 2,000) persons) who desire 
repatriation, we would consider authorizing the Cuban Olympic flights. We have 
been trying unsuccessfully for weeks to obtain permission to augment our refugee 
flights to bring out the Americans.105  
Johnson also elevated the Presidential Council on Youth Fitness to a cabinet-level 
group, replaced the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as the council chair with 
the Vice President, and changed the title to the President’s Council on Physical Fitness & 
Sports. He also began the tradition of welcoming the Olympic team to the White House 
after returning from the Games, a move that took much pressuring from the USOC and 
could potentially be seen as a reward for their cooperation with government wishes.  
Having established that the US government and USOC worked closely, we can 
infer that the USOC may have been privy to much of the same information as to the 
situation in Mexico in the months leading up to the Games, and that their interests would 
have aligned.  
 
A Growing Relationship  
Though Mexico was an ally of the US during World War II, in the following 
decades, the relationship with Mexico was, if friendly, “remarkably uninstitutionalized.”106 
Regardless, the US government was highly invested in the stability of Mexico. The shared 
border between the two countries is one reason. As historian and Ambassador and 
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Permanent Representative of the United States to the Organization of American States Gale 
McGee wrote:  
 
The fact of proximity makes the management of relationships with Mexico different 
from the conduct of US affairs with, for example, Argentina of Brazil. Every day, 
scores of local, state, and federal government agencies are involved in matters that 
have impact on both sides of the border.107 
Economic and global trade complicated the situation as well. In 1979, future 
president George HW Bush wrote on the growing ties between the two countries: 
 
Bilateral trade is a significant and growing economic tie between the two countries. 
More than 60% of Mexico’s exports are sold in US markets, and Mexico ranks as 
the fifth largest importer of US goods. In 1978 US exports to Mexico amounted to 
more than $5 billion; the potential for the future is even greater since the Mexican 
population exceeds 65 million and is increasing. But Mexico’s ability to utilize its 
oil resources effectively and to sustain a rapid growth rate in its domestic economy 
will depend on its ability to expand nonoil exports to the United States. Thus the 
evolution of US trade policies toward Mexico will have multiple effects on 
American producers and consumers.108 
The economic relationship between Mexico and the United States may not have 
been quite this strong eleven years prior in 1968, but at the time, Mexico was experiencing 
an era of rapid growth, making the future easy to envision. During the 1960s Mexico was 
taking its first steps into the expanding global marketplace, as the country welcomed more 
foreign investment and denationalized its banks. Thus, it made sense for Covey Oliver, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, to write a post-massacre letter to Dean Rusk 
stating, “We believe it important to avoid any indication that we lack confidence in the 
[Government of Mexico’s] ability to control the situation.”109 And from this, we can 
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assume it’s probable that someone in his camp contacted the USOC and IOC with the same 
message.  
 
Brundage Does His Part 
Avery Brundage made the stance of the IOC very clear the day after the massacre, 
condemning the Mexican government in the strongest possible terms: “I was at the ballet 
last night, and we heard nothing of the riots.”110 True to his character, Brundage wanted 
nothing to do with anything that would distract from his beloved Games. Brundage  
indirectly admits to attempting to distance the two events from each other in a letter to the 
chair of the Mexican Organizing Committee shortly after the Games ended. The 
Committee, as is customary, was putting together a film of the Games for dissemination 
and sale, and Brundage discovered they planned to include footage of the Carlos-Smith 
protest. Outraged, Brundage wrote to Jose de J. Clark, “[The protest] had nothing to do 
with sport, it was a shameful abuse of hospitality and it had no more place in the record of 
the Games than the gunfire at Tlatelolco.”111 Similarly, Guardian reporter John Rodda 
years later confirmed rumors that Brundage had been pressuring Díaz Ordaz in the weeks 
leading up to the massacre to make sure there would be no disruption of the Games, 
threatening to pull the celebration if there was.112 
Prior to the Games, at the previously mentioned general body meeting of the IOC, 
just days after the violence in La Plaza de las Tres Culturas, Brundage was already trying 
to distance his organization from the violence it was responsible for, saying:  
                                                 
110 Hoffer. Something in the Air. Page 116.  
111 Boykoff. Power Games. Page 109. Per C. Brewster, Brundage had always seen Clark Flores as one of 
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112 Around the turn of the century, Rodda had been writing the biography of Arthur Takac, a prominent 
Yugoslav athlete-turned-sport administrator. During the 1968 Games, Takac revealed to Rodda, Takac was 
aide to Brundage, and personally delivered letters to this effect to the Mexican President in mid-September.  
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We live today in an uneasy and even rebellious world, a world marked by injustice, 
aggression, demonstrations, disorder, turmoil, violence and war, against which all 
civilized persons rebel, but this is no reason to destroy the nucleus of international 
cooperation and goodwill we have created in the Olympic Movement. You don’t 
find hippies, yippies, or beatniks on sports grounds.113 
Of course, even this nod to “a world marked by injustice” was designed to simply 
get everyone to move past the massacre and onto more important matters. Brundage didn’t 
care about injustice, and most likely approved of Díaz Ordaz’s handling of the situation. 
Though he was technically on the record as an anticommunist, he did not have much love 
to spare for democracy either.114 A profile in Life magazine referred to his dictatorial 
temperament, while reporter David Miller, who has drank the Olympic Kool-Aid as much 
as anyone, described him as “despotic, a moral bulldozer.”115 And he had an affinity for 
any national government, like Mexico’s PRI, that shared these traits. In 1955, Brundage 
waxed poetic over one such state: 
 
An intelligent, beneficent dictatorship is the most efficient form of government. 
Observe what happened in Germany for six or seven years in the 1930’s. [Germany] 
had a plan which brought it from almost bankruptcy to be the most powerful 
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country in the world in a half dozen years. Other countries with dictators have 
accompanied the same thing in a smaller way.116  
Brundage was firmly against the incursion of politics in sport, but that didn’t stop 
his own political beliefs from bleeding into how he ran his fiefdom. Brundage was not 
afraid to lean on the national committees when he needed to, a reflection of the despots he 
admired throughout history. At that very same Olympics in 1968, Brundage pressured the 
USOC to send home Tommie Smith and John Carlos after their protest, a move the USOC 
did not plan to make of their own volition. Henderson quotes the USOC press chief at the 
time, who stated somewhat bitterly, “The IOC had exerted its authority. The USOC further 
accepted the IOC authority.”117 
Thus, it is consistent with his past behavior that Brundage and the IOC he controlled 
would work to suppress news of the massacre in order to preserve the celebratory 
atmosphere of the Games. Despite having graduated from the USOC to the IOC a decade 
and a half earlier, Brundage seemingly pressured the USOC to take a similar stance of ‘see 
no evil, speak no evil.’ 
U.S. athletes from the 1968 Olympic Team report that much of their movement 
while in Mexico City was limited. As boxer George Foreman said in a 2012 interview, 
“We were being warned to steer clear and maybe we shouldn’t go out of the Olympic 
village because there was so much carrying on. […] They asked us to stay close to the 
village and not wander off too far.”118 Other athletes made it sound like much less of a 
suggestion. Per swimmer Jane Swaggerty, “Once we got to Mexico City we were pretty 
well isolated within the Olympic village itself. We weren’t able to leave the village until 
                                                 
116 Boykoff. Power Games. Page 89. Despite Brundage’s many criticisms of the Soviet state, he took time 
to praise them as well for their lack of political parties and labor strikes.  
117 Henderson. “Crossing the Line.” Page 109.  
118 George Foreman interview. H.J. Lutcher Stark Center Oral History Project. 
 34 
our event was over.”119 Her teammate Lynn Vidali suggested that even after their events 
were over they were not encouraged to go exploring, saying that “After I swam and I was 
done I wasn’t allowed to leave the Olympic village but I did.”120 Volleyball player Nancy 
Owen was a veteran on the team, having attended the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo as 
well. She said that at her first Games they were much more encouraged to partake in what 
the host city had to offer, to the extent that “In Japan we had interpreters that went 
everywhere with us, but in Mexico City we were on our own.”121 
Many athletes referenced this idea of being insulated in the village, and how what 
news they received seemed to be filtered as well. Regarding the massacre, gymnast Carolyn 
Pingatore swore she had no idea what had happened: “Nothing was said at the training 
camp, nothing was said by the other coaches. […] the number one thing I remember them 
telling us is don’t be panicked when we get off the plane or we get to the Olympic village 
and we see army people and guns.”122 Swimmer Kimla Brecht echoed this sentiment, 
saying that she “didn’t actually hear about the student protests or the massacre that occurred 
until years later.”123 According to her teammate Susan Pedersen, “I’d call home and my 
mom would say ‘What do you think about that,’ and I’m going ‘I haven’t heard a thing.’”124 
Canoeist John Pickett explained that there was an embargo on newspapers in the village: 
“They don’t tell us much out here. We don’t get the papers, so we don’t know.”125  
Even for those that did find access to outside news, it did not prove informative—
or accurate. Shooter Gary Anderson heard about what happened, but what he heard seemed 
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to be strictly the government narrative and not the true story exposed by The Guardian and 
Mexican activists: “I don’t remember the death toll that was reported but my memory is 
that is was in the 10s, 15, 20—some number like that. […] It was clear the Olympics were 
going to move ahead, they were going to go. The Mexican government, Mexican 
authorities, Mexican Olympic Committee were committed to making this happen.”126 
Brecht said that she “didn’t see anything in the news about protests. Once I got down there 
if you pick up a newspaper it was mostly about the Olympics. […] the focus was clearly 
on the Olympics and they tried to get anything that would hazardize [sic] our safety behind 
and very well controlled in the media. […] I was unaware of the student protest and the 
massacre.”127 Swimmer Debbie Meyer similarly remembers a dearth of information on the 
massacre in the papers: “The biggest thing in our papers would be the Vietnam war. That 
was the biggest headline every single day.” She continued on, saying that they were fed a 
much less violent version of events: “We were told that it was just student unrest and that 
a few hundred students were injured.”128 She said she did not discover the full scale of the 
atrocity until returning to Mexico City 40 years later with other members of the 1968 
team.129  
Sports-writer Richard Hoffer looked somewhat charitably on these Olympic 
administrators, describing them as “clueless” but adding that “Had anyone known the true 
scope of the disaster, there surely would have been more outcry.”130 But considering the 
absoluteness with which the Olympics take over a city, I’m skeptical that any event of that 
                                                 
126 Gary Anderson interview. H.J. Lutcher Stark Center Oral History Project. 
127 Brecht interview.  
128 Debbie Meyer interview. H.J. Lutcher Stark Center Oral History Project. 
129 Note that though the news had not penetrated the bubble of the Olympic Village, by 4 October 1968 it 
was already being covered in the United States by the New York Times, Dallas Morning News, and 
others—all of whom took a much more critical view of the Mexican government’s reporting of events than 
the US government did.  
130 Hoffer. Something in the Air. Page 116.  
 36 
magnitude could possibly happen just days before the Games open without an Olympic 
administrator being aware. Per a Reuters report published in the 4 October 1968 edition of 
The Guardian, “Managers of some Olympic teams have meanwhile banned from their 
headquarters newspapers carrying reports of violence. They said that the reports were 
upsetting their teams and having a bad effect on training sessions.”131 This suggests that 
those Olympic committee members were not at all clueless, but deliberate and ruthless. 
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Chapter 4: The Scars of Tlatelolco  
In chapter 2, I showed that the US government was well aware of the deteriorating situation 
in Mexico and the potential for violence. In chapter 3, I established the strong connections 
between the Olympic Movement and the US government as evidence that the USOC and 
IOC were also likely aware of the situation. I then showed that the IOC and USOC 
suppressed information about the massacre at Tlatelolco. Here in chapter 4, I will discuss 
the consequences of their actions.  
To understand the impact of Tlatelolco, the true scope of the crime must be 
understood. The list of victims is not limited to the several hundred men, women, and 
children that were murdered that day. Nor is it just those that experienced the trauma of the 
event first-hand. Rather, it is every single Mexican citizen whose life is worse off because 
the progressive student movement was crushed. This is because the massacre was not just 
a personal trauma for those with a directly link to the event, but a trauma on a cultural level. 
As sociologist Jeffery Alexander defined it:  
Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been 
subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group 
consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity 
in fundamental and irrevocable ways.132  
 
 The famed Kai Erickson offered a different, though related, definition, writing that 
cultural trauma as “a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds 
attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of community.”133 Institutions, 
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such as the state, need to fulfill certain expected roles for individuals to feel securely 
anchored in society, and the massacre clearly violated that role.  
 Much of this continual, intergenerational trauma comes from the uncertainty 
surrounding the event. For one, the Mexican people have never been able to get an accurate 
body count or list of names. Estimates oscillate from the half dozen claimed by the state 
up into the thousands, with most putting the number somewhere in the 300s134. As Hoffer 
wrote, this problem was exacerbated because after the massacre, “many of the students 
went into hiding, some joining guerrilla groups in the hinterlands, so it was difficult to say 
who had been killed and who had simply fled.”135 Reports of secret cremations of the 
bodies at Mexico City hospitals abounded. Even today, despite the PRI no longer casting 
the shadow over Mexico it once did, many relevant documents are still locked away, 
leaving unanswered questions about who knew what and who is responsible.  
 When addressed, cultural traumas can “broaden the realm of social understanding 
and sympathy, and they provide powerful avenues for new forms of social 
incorporation.”136 Unfortunately for those victims of Tlatelolco, governments often play 
key roles in helping communities move past their trauma. Alexander writes that:  
Decisions by the executive branches of governments to create national 
commissions of inquiry, votes by parliaments to establish investigative committees, 
the creation of state-directed police investigations and new directives about national 
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priorities—all such actions can have decisive effects on handling and channeling 
the spiral of signification that marks the trauma process.137 
 
Events, like the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, that help answer these questions and 
provide closure play an important part in allowing said traumatized groups to move on.138 
On South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Alexander wrote:  
The effort succeeded to a significant degree in generalizing the trauma process 
beyond racially polarized audiences, making it into a shared experience of the new, 
more solidary, and more democratic South Africa.139 
 
Similarly, in the United States the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 provided reparations 
for interned Japanese Americans and admitted the culpability of the US government. On 
the other hand, events like the Rape of Nanking, or Tlatelolco, feature none of this closure. 
In the early 2000s there was hope. The Mexican people elected Vincente Fox of the 
National Action Party in 2000, marking the first defeat for the PRI and a potential harbinger 
of true democracy. While campaigning, Fox pledged to bring to light the crimes committed 
by the PRI, and when elected established a special prosecutor’s office to this effect. But 
though the PRI no longer occupied Los Pinos, they proved to still control the 
government.140 The special prosecutor was hamstrung by an uncooperative judiciary and 
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an openly hostile military, and the whole project proved to be an abject failure.141 In an 
effort to live up to his pledge, Fox issued an executive order that “all information relevant 
to the investigation of past human rights violations and crimes” be entered into the Archivo 
General de la Nacion (AGN), Mexico’s national archives, where they would be openly 
available to the public. But even here the PRI and those loyal to them have managed to 
stymie efforts at uncovering the truth.142 The archives are now burgeoning with papers 
documenting the PRI’s reign of terror, but many of the most important collections 
conveniently lack the indices that would make it possible to find anything and are all 
overseen by an archivist that, per the Human Rights Watch, “is very selective about the 
documents he releases.”143 Additionally, the PRI-controlled congress refuses to properly 
fund the archive as to prevent cataloging.144  
As Mexican writer and political activist Jose Revueltas put it, Tlatelolco is “a story 
that will never end because others will continue writing it,” searching for those answers. 
Professor Samuel Steinberg echoed that sentiment, writing:  
The story, whatever it is, will remain unfinished or open as long as it continues to 
demand that its writing continue. The seemingly unfinished nature of “Tlatelolco” 
thus resides in the obscurity of what the signifier hopes to name, the constitutive 
failure of its consignation to the name that rules over it. Its story will continue being 
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written because the subjective name for whatever event occurred in 1968 has not 
yet satisfactorily emerged.145 
 
 The lack of closure around Tlatelolco has had concrete political consequences as 
well. After the massacre, noted Witherspoon, “The student movement was, for all practical 
purposes, dead.”146 The goals of the movement and the students’ calls for democracy have 
been overshadowed by what happened on 2 October. As Mexican writer and political 
activist Carlos Monsivais said, “Unfortunately, and with troubling consequences, the 
outward appearance and great symbolic shelter of the 1968 Student Movement is the Plaza 
de las Tres Culturas.147 Any discussion of the student movement has become not centered 
around their goals or the injustices in Mexican society that led them to protest, but 
uniformly the historical fact of the massacre. It is the beginning and end, at the cost of any 
actual politics. As Steinberg wrote, “The massacre has come to obscure, conceal, and 
protect the memory of the more properly political event that it was intended to interrupt.”148 
The goals of the student movement were sacrificed in favor of ‘finding answers’ 
and seeking justice for the murdered. Díaz Ordaz and the state won, not because they killed 
many of the movement’s leaders, but because they redirected energy away from the 
material gains the people sought and towards more abstract goals. The massacre has turned 
into the point by which any movement post-1968 would orient itself, from which any future 
would need to grow out of. Steinburg refers to this as the “double repression” of the student 
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movement, with Tlatelolco as both “a literal and metaphorical crypt.”149 It marks the death 
of not just those activists but their ideas as well. This defeat is illustrated most clearly by 
the very structure of Elena Poniatowska’s famous Massacre in Mexico (La noche de 
Tlatelolco in the original Spanish), which professor Chris Harris described as being 
“perceived as the defining account of the student experience in 1968.”150 The book acts as 
an oral history of the protests of 1968, up to and beyond the massacre itself. Yet it draws 
its name from the act that has come to define everything that surrounds it.151 
Unfortunately, the massacre fits neatly into the Mexican narrative of progress, a 
narrative reflected in a historical marker in La Plaza de las Tres Culturas. The marker 
predates the massacre, instead commemorating the other bloody encounter that space 
played host to: the capture of Tenochtitlan by Spanish conquistadors. The marker reads:  
The 13th of August, 1521, heroically defended by Cuauhtémoc, Tlatelolco fell to 
the power of Hernan Cortes. It was neither victory, nor defeat. It was the painful 
birth of the mestizo people, which is the Mexico of today.152 
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This idea that moving forward can only come through martyrdom is the leitmotif 
of Mexican history, as these acts become not crimes but origins. Steinberg calls it “sacrifice 
as politics,” saying how the massacre comfortably fits the tragic pattern of Mexican history 
where violence and death are necessary precursors to social progress.153 The 1968 massacre 
was, to the people of Mexico, only an echo of the past, an echo that has come to define 
Mexican identity. As Steinberg explains, this new Tlatelolco massacre obeys “the maxim 
that there is neither triumph nor defeat, but always the painful birth of the mestizo 
people.”154 
For decades, the mestizo people received no answers about their most recent violent 
birth. Then concurrently with the rise of Vincente Fox, a breakthrough occurred as Mexican 
current affairs weekly magazine Proceso famously published the first ever widely 
circulated group of images from 2 October 1968. The 35 photographs, submitted 
anonymously to reporters at the magazine, contained graphic images of the brutality the 
students were subjected to at the hands of their government. But more importantly, they 
acted as final confirmation to the citizenry that what they had been told by their government 
was a lie, finally bridging the gap between knowledge and proof. For decades, rumors had 
circulated that much of the violence was perpetrated by the Batallon Olimpia, a military 
group raised solely for the Olympic Games, identified by the single white glove its 
members wore. That glove, and the truth it represented, were featured prominently on the 
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historic December 2001 cover of Proceso next to the battered body of student leader 
Florencio Lopez Osuna.  
 
Lopez Osuna died under very suspicious circumstances within a few weeks of the 
publication of this issue, and no further information about the massacre followed these 
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images, but it that moment it seemed that answers were within reach, and that moving on 
would soon be possible. As Monsivais wrote on the photos:  
Had they been published the third of fourth of October [1968], these photos would 
have instantly given lie to the official explanations and to the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional’s discourse of perpetual whitewashing. […] In 2001, 
the photos from Proceso don’t allow “grumblings between the teeth,” the extremely 
forced apologies of the regime and its party, and prove what is already known: the 
attempt to eradicate the spirit of the movement by force follows the military-led 
massacre.155 
 
This is the true crime that falls at the feet of the IOC—not their failure to stop the 
violence but rather their failure to speak up afterwards. They could have cut through the 
lies of the Díaz Ordaz administration immediately, sparing the Mexican people decades of 
uncertainty.  
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Conclusion 
In 1965, Lyndon Johnson invited playwright Arthur Miller to the White House to celebrate 
the signing of the Arts and Humanities Act. Miller, in protest of Johnson’s escalation of 
the Vietnam War, decided not to attend. He famously responded to Johnson’s invitation by 
replying “When the guns boom, the arts die.” Three years later, we learned that no such 
fate would befall sport in the face of violence. 
In its most idealistic form, the Olympics were supposed to prevent crimes like this, 
not cause them. Baron Pierre de Coubertin, who revived the Olympic Games in the late 
19th century, wrote, 
War breaks out because nations misunderstand each other. We shall not have peace 
until the prejudices which now separate the different races shall have been outlived. 
To attain this end, what better means than to bring the youth of all countries 
periodically together for amicable trials of muscular strength and agility?156 
 
But almost immediately, it was evident the concept would never match the praxis. 
As early as 1908, Theodore Roosevelt, an early champion of physical culture, grumbled “I 
do not believe in these international matches, where the feeling is so intense it is almost 
impossible that there should not be misunderstandings.”157 In 1924, The Times of London 
wrote that the idea of using sport to form “a brotherhood so close and loving that it would 
form a bulwark against the outbreak of all international animosities” was fantastical. 
“There has for a long time been profound and widespread misgiving whether the Games 
had not in practice served to inflame animosities rather than to allay them.”158 
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The mistake that was the 1936 Games in Berlin did not prove the be the course 
correction that it should have been. World War II caused both the 1940 and 1944 iterations 
of the Games to be cancelled, but the advent of the Cold War extinguished any hope of the 
poison of nationalism being expelled from the Games upon their reinstatement. This 
thought was expressed most passionately in George Orwell’s famous 1945 essay, “The 
Sporting Spirit.” Orwell wrote, reflecting on a recent tour of Britain by the Soviet national 
football team, that “sport is an unfailing cause of ill-will, and that if such a visit as this had 
any effect at all on Anglo-Soviet relations, it could only be to make them slightly worse 
than before.”159 He added that “even if one didn't know from concrete examples that 
international sporting contests lead to orgies of hatred, one could deduce it from general 
principles.”160 But even at his most pessimistic, Orwell still managed to understate the pain 
that sport could bring down upon a community. He wrote, 
Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, 
boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence: in 
other words it is war minus the shooting.161 
 
But the Mexico City Games had all these things, plus the shooting. The Olympics 
are in theory supposed to be “a two-week window of peace, an international armistice, a 
truce.”162 Mexico City proved that to be a lie, confirmed by every subsequent iteration of 
the Games.  
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Mexico City gave us the best of what the Olympics have to offer: incredible feats 
of strength and speed, showcases of the world’s finest artists, exhibits on the indomitability 
of the human spirit. But it also gave us the worst parts, the death and misery that is not a 
bug in the Games, but a feature. The 1968 Olympics were a turning point in many regards. 
They were the first Olympics to be broadcast live on television. They were the first Games 
to feature doping and sex testing of athletes. And they were the first Games to establish the 
high cost the world would pay to have them.  
People died in Mexico City because of the Olympic Games. People also died in Los 
Angeles, Rio, and elsewhere, and they will continue to die because the IOC established in 
1968 that they do not care if people die or not. The ideals the Olympic Movement profess 
to hold are good ones and should not be dismissed out of hand. But for the past 50 years at 
least, those ideals have been nothing more than window dressing, a nice paint job on the 
bulldozer the Games have become. The Games could have been a positive force in a world 
that needs more of them. But such courses have been eschewed in exchange for shiny new 
stadia and large revenue streams.  
And so it was with Mexico. Their Olympic bid started out as a potential sign of the 
country’s bright future, so easy to imagine in the heady days of the early 1960s. As 
Witherspoon wrote, “Winning the Olympic bid was perhaps the signal achievement in an 
image building project in Mexico that had been decades in the making.”163 What these 
Games were really about, he explained, was “Mexico’s quest to join the ranks of the 
                                                 
163 Witherspoon. Before the Eyes of the World. Page 3.  
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world’s “modern” nations.”164 But by the time the Games actually rolled around, the 
pressure to perform on the world stage proved too much for Díaz Ordaz and company. As 
the situation grew progressively more tumultuous, the Mexican government sought 
stability. And said stability, again as Witherspoon put it, “came at the price of true 
democracy.”165 
 Things have changed in Mexico in the 50 years since Tlatelolco. As Noble wrote, 
Tlatelolco was something of an inflection point in Mexican history: 
This was the moment at which the full force of the repressive authoritarianism of 
the PRI made itself publicly felt, triggering the slow process of democratic reform 
that eventually led to its historic—defeat after 71 years in power—in the 2000 
presidential elections.166  
 
 But others caution against such optimistic views. Paz believed that Tlatelolco 
effectively marked the death of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution, confirming finally 
the state’s inability to stand up to the pressures of slowly encroaching neoliberalism. One 
Latin American scholar conceded that “Because of the wave of criticism that followed the 
Tlatelolco massacre, the Mexican government is much more reluctant to engage in large-
scale repressive activities,” but added that “it would be a mistake to believe that Tlatelolco 
1968 has produced substantive improvements in Mexico’s social system.”167 The so-called 
“democratic reform” has mostly been cosmetic, as the PRI has decided to allow other 
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political parties to exist without really affecting the governance of the state. The PRI retook 
the presidency in 2012 after two terms out of office, a period that was not the reformist era 
many expected it to be. 
And so even today, thanks to the failures of not just the Mexican state and media, 
but also Avery Brundage, the IOC, and the USOC, Tlatelolco haunts the Mexican 
consciousness. Information will continue to trickle out as scholars complete the Sisyphean 
task of combing the AGN. As Zolov wrote, research on Tlatelolco “continues to expand as 
access to government documents on both sides of the border becomes available.”168 Yet 
for all the questions that have been answered, still no one has been held responsible; very 
little healing has taken place. And with the PRI back in power, that seems unlikely to 
change any time soon. So, as Steinberg wrote, “The truth of the massacre is largely known 
yet, simultaneously, held as an open secret, in lucid obscurity.”169   
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